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CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER ROME STATUTE:
A JUS AD BELLUM PERSPECTIVE*
** Emre TURKUT
It is not peace which was natural and primitive and old, but rather war.
War appears to be as old as mankind, but peace is a modern invention.1
ROMA STATÜSÜNDE SALDIRI SUÇU: BİR JUS AD BELLUM 
PERSPEKTİFİ
Özet
2010 yılında, Kampala Konferansı’ndaki delegeler, saldırganlık suçunun, 
Uluslararası Ceza Mahkemesi (UCM) yetkisine dâhil edilmesi hususunda, 
saldırganlık kavramının yüksek derecede politik tabiatı dolayısıyla, güçlü 
muhalefetlerle karşılaştılar. Bu tablo, gerçekten de, saldırganlık kavramının 
tanımı üzerine yoğun düşünce farklılıklarını kanıtlamaktadır. Kuvvet kullanma 
yasağının her türlü ciddi ihlali, jus ad bellum kapsamında saldırganlık oluşturur. 
Bununla birlikte, Roma Statüsü, jus ad bellum’da olan tanımdan daha dar bir 
tanım getirmiş, bunun sonucunda uluslararası sorumluluk için daha yüksek bir 
sınır öngörmüştür. Dar bir saldırganlık tanımı yaratmak UCM’nin amaçları 
bağlamında anlaşılabilir ve ikna edici görünse de, bu yaklaşımın jus ad 
bellum kavramının etkisini azaltma potansiyeli vardır. Bundan dolayı, bu 
makale uluslararası ceza hukukundaki saldırganlık fenomenini analiz etmeyi 
*  This paper was presented at the 4th International Public Law Conference (IPLC) organi-
sed by the International Association of IT Lawyers, held in Lisbon, Portugal on 15-17 
October 2014.
** Research Assistant at Turgut Ozal University, Law School, Public International Law 
Department, eturkut@turgutozal.edu.tr
1 Sir Henry Sumner Maine, International Law (London 1888) 8 cited in Majid Khadduri, 
War and Peace in the Law of Islam (first published 1955, The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 
Clark-New Jersey, 2006) 72
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amaçlamaktadır. Bilhassa, saldırganlık kavramının tarihsel arka planıyla yola 
çıkmakta ve Roma Statüsü’ndeki saldırganlık suçu ile jus ad bellum’daki 
saldırganlık konsepti arasındaki bağlantıyı sorgulayarak, saldırganlık 
kavramının tanımını incelemektedir. Bu anlamda, yakın gelecekteki başarılı 
UCM kovuşturmaları adına bazı problem ve görünmez tehlikeleri görünür 
kılmayı amaçlamaktadır.
Anahtar kelimeler: Saldırganlık, UCM, Roma Statüsü, Kampala 
Konferansı, Jus Ad Bellum.
CRIME OF AGGRESSION UNDER ROME STATUTE: 
 A JUS AD BELLUM PERSPECTIVE
Abstract
In 2000, the delegates to Kampala Review Conference confronted 
strong oppositions to include the aggression within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court due to the highly political nature of the concept 
of ‘aggression’ itself. This picture, indeed, proves the intense differences of 
opinions about the definition of aggression. Under the jus ad bellum, any 
serious violation of the prohibition on the use of force constitutes aggression. 
However, the Rome Statute of the ICC provides a much narrower definition 
than the one within the jus ad bellum, and thus, a higher threshold for the 
international responsibility. Creating a narrower definition is understandable 
and convincing for the purposes of the ICC; however this approach has a 
potential to dilute the jus ad bellum. Therefore, at the outset, this paper aims to 
critically analyse the phenomenon of aggression in international criminal law. 
It particularly starts with searching the historical background of aggression, 
and then examines the definition of aggression under the Rome Statute as 
pointing the correlation between the crime of aggression under Rome Statute 
and the concept of aggression within jus ad bellum. In this way, it tries to show 
some problems and pitfalls regarding the forthcoming successful prosecutions 
of the ICC.
Key words: Aggression, ICC, Rome Statute, Kampala Conference, Jus 
Ad Bellum.
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ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЕ  АГРЕССИИ В РИМСКОМ СТАТУТЕ: 
ПЕРСПЕКТИВА JUS AD BELLUM
Аннотация
В 2010 году  делегаты на Кампальской конференции столкнулись с 
сильной оппозицией   по поводу включения агрессии   под юрисдикцию 
Международного уголовного суда, из-за крайне политического 
характера  данного термина. Эта картина доказывает существование 
широких   различий  в мнениях  об определении агрессии. Под jus ad 
bellum любое серьезное нарушение запрета на применение силы и 
считается агрессией. Однако Римский статут МУС обеспечивает гораздо 
более узкое определение, чем в jus ad bellum, и, таким образом, более 
высокий порог для международной ответственности. Создание более 
узкого определения - это понятные и убедительные для целей МУС, 
однако, этот подход может снизить потенциал силы  jus ad bellum. 
Поэтому эта статья направлена на то, чтобы  проанализировать феномен 
агрессии в международном уголовном праве. И в частности, начинается 
с поиска исторических предпосылок агрессии, а затем рассматривает 
определение агрессии согласно Римскому статуту, как указывающую 
корреляцию между преступлением  агрессии в соответствии с Римским 
статутом и понятием  агрессии в рамках jus ad bellum. Таким образом, 
в статье предпринята попытка раскрыть некоторые проблемы и так 
называемые «подводные камни», касающиеся предстоящих  успешных 
преследований  МУС.
Ключевые слова: Агрессия, МУС, Римский статут,  Кампальская 
конференция, Jus Ad Bellum.
    INTRODUCTION
This paper begins unlikely in a way, with a famous quotation of Benjamin 
Ferencz who made great contributions to international criminal law: “The most 
important accomplishment of the Nuremberg trials was the condemnation of 
illegal war-making as the supreme international crime. That great step forward 
in the evolution of international humanitarian law must not be discarded or 
allowed to wither. Insisting that wars cannot be prevented is a self-defeating 
prophecy of doom that repudiates the rule of law. Nuremberg was a triumph 
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of Reason over Power. Allowing aggression to remain unpunishable would be 
a triumph of Power over Reason.”2
Ben Ferencz, a former prosecutor at Nuremberg trials has constantly 
argued that the crime of aggression should be included in the Rome Statute 
of International Criminal Court (hereinafter- the ICC).3 On 17 July 1998, 
the Rome Statute was adopted. Following the necessary 60 ratifications, the 
Statute was entered into force in 2002 and the International Criminal Court 
was officially established. The Rome Statute provided a jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression; however there were no consensus on certain aspects. 
Therefore, the Statute did not authorize the Court to exercise jurisdiction over 
this crime until the provision defining the crime and setting out the conditions 
was adopted in Kampala Review Conference in 2010.
 Although in international law the prohibition on aggression is 
considered a jus cogens norm, in Kampala the delegates to ICC Review 
Conference confronted strong oppositions. Some delegates strongly defended 
that the crime of aggression should not be incorporated within the jurisdiction 
of the ICC, at all.4 Because, prosecuting such a crime will be too difficult due 
to its highly political nature.
This picture, indeed, proves the intense differences of opinions about the 
definition of aggression. Therefore, this paper aims to critically analyse the 
phenomenon of aggression in international criminal law. It particularly starts 
with searching the historical background of aggression, and then examines the 
definition of aggression under the Rome Statute as pointing the correlation 
between the crime of aggression under Rome Statute and the concept of 
aggression within jus ad bellum. In this way, it tries to show some problems 
and pitfalls regarding forthcoming successful ICC prosecutions. 
2 Benjamin B. Ferencz, ‘Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression’, (2009) 41 Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 281, 290
3 As a matter of fact, the inclusion of aggression could mean a closure of a loophole. 
Because in 1945 San Francisco drafting conference, a US delegate expressed clearly that 
“the intention of the authors of the original text was to state in the broadest terms an 
absolute all-inclusive prohibition; … there should be no loopholes.” United Nations 
Conference on International Organization, Vol. 6 (UN Information Organizations, 1945) 
34, 35
4 H.H. Koh, ‘Statement Regarding Crime of Aggression at the Resumed Eighth Session 
of the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court’, 23 March 2010, 
<http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2010/139000.htm> accessed 24 April 2014
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THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: A BRIEF HISTORICAL REVIEW
FROM PEACE OF WESTPHALIA TO KAMPALA
International community has had a major concern of ending conflicts and 
maintaining peace since The Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The series of treaties 
which gave rise modern international law and a new political order placing 
sovereign state system in its centre, provided that states must try to resolve 
problems peacefully.5 However, the first attempt to entrench the individual 
accountability for engaging in aggression was the trial of German Kaiser by a 
special tribunal provided in Article 27 of the Versailles Treaty for “a supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.”6
Although the Covenant of League of Nations condemned the ‘external 
aggression’ for the first time in 19197; under international law, prohibiting 
states from engaging in aggression came only true with the adoption of 
Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact in 1928.8 The pact did not give a definition of 
aggression or even used the particular term, but condemned “recourse to war 
for the solution of international controversies.”9 Furthermore, the pact did 
not provide the provisions of criminal accountability for individuals10, but this 
became possible by the judges of Nuremberg who relied on the premise that 
a war of aggression had been a crime under international law since Kellogg-
Briand Pact.
Aggression has been prosecuted as an international crime of individuals by 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals as “crime against peace.”11 The crime was 
defined as “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
5 M.E. O’Connell, International Law and the Use of Force: Cases and Materials (2nd edn., 
Foundation Press, 2009) 127-129
6 ibid, 142
7 ibid, 139 and R.L. Griffiths, ‘International Law, the Crime of Aggression and the Jus Ad 
Bellum’, (2002) 2 International Criminal Law Review 301, 303
8 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy, 27 August 
1928
9 ibid, article 1
10 Michael J. Glennon, ‘The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression’ (2010) 35 Yale J. Int’l L. 71, 74
11 A. Cassese, International Criminal Law, (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 2008) 152
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of the foregoing.”12 The Nuremberg Tribunal convicted twelve defendants and 
the Tokyo Tribunal found twenty-five defendants guilty of engaging aggressive 
war.13 However, judgements only focused on punishing the aggression, but 
provided no provision as to how it must be defined.14
In the 1950s, International Law Commission attempted to codify a Code 
of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind by the authorization of 
United Nations General Assembly (hereinafter- the UNGA), but difficulties to 
define such a crime ended up as suspension of the ILC in 1954.15
Following unsuccessful efforts, on 14 December 1974 the UNGA 
adopted a resolution on aggression.16 Significantly, Resolution 3314 provided 
a definition of act of aggression17, but, “no explicit reference to individual 
criminal responsibility.”18 However, Resolution 3314 played an important 
role in the subsequent efforts to codify the crime of aggression and served 
as “the backbone19” of Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
(hereinafter- SWGCA)’s proposed definition  in Kampala.20
On 17 July 1998, Rome Statute was adopted21 and the Statute provided 
a jurisdiction for the ICC over the crime of aggression.22 However, “the crime 
of aggression was stillborn.”23 Because, the state parties could not reach 
consensus on two aspects: “a) the definition of the crime and b) the conditions 
12 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Annex to the Agreement for the Prosecu-
tion and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 8 August 1945, 
Annex, 39 AJIL (1945) Suppl. 258, article 6 (a)
13 Glennon (n 10) 74
14 Andreas Paulus, ‘Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression’ (2009) 20.4 EJIL 1117, 
1120
15 G.A. Res. 897 (IX), at 50, U.N. Doc A/2890 (Dec. 4, 1954)
16 Definition of Aggression, UN GA Res. 3314 (XXIX), UNGA OR 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, 
UN Doc A/Res/3314 (1974)
17 Resolution 3314 article 1: “Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations …”
18 Glennon (n 10) 79
19 ibid
20 Kai Ambos, ‘The Crime of Aggression after Kampala’ (2010) 53 GYIL 463, 464
21 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 
2002, UN Doc. A/CONF. 183/9; 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
22 Rome Statute, article 5.
23 D. Scheffer, ‘The Complex Crime of Aggression under the Rome Statute’ (2010) 23 LJIL 
897, 897
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for the exercise of jurisdiction over it.”24 Therefore, it was decided that the 
Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression until further 
provisions defining the crime and setting out the conditions were adopted.25
The task to work on the proposals of aggression was given initially to 
the Preparatory Commission (1999-2002)26 and SWGCA (2003- 2009).27 
Finally, The SWGCA’s proposal was adopted by the Assembly of State Parties 
on 26 November 200928 and presented to the delegates to Kampala Review 
Conference under the name of “Conference Room Paper on the Crime of 
Aggression” on 25 May 2010.29
THE KAMPALA REVIEW CONFERENCE
The conference took place in Kampala, Uganda between 31 May and 11 
June 2010.30 In Kampala, the delegates adopted a resolution on the crime of 
aggression by consensus. The resolution amended the annexes I, II and III.31 
These amendments include: “a) the definition for the crime (details a crime 
and an act of aggression), b) the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, c) 
elements of the crime and d) seven understandings on the crime of aggression 
for the further prosecutions.”32
24 C. Wenaweser, ‘Reaching the Kampala Compromise on Aggression: The Chair’s 
Perspective’ (2010) 23 LJIL 883, 884
25 Rome Statute, article 5(2).
26 Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF.183/10, 17 July 
1998, Annex I, Resolution F
27 Resolution on Continuity of  Work in Respect of the Crime of Aggression, ICC-ASP/1/
Res.1, 9 September 2002
28 Res. ICC-ASP/8/Res.6. The proposal  is annexed as appendix I to the February 2009 Re-
port of the SWGCA (ICC-ASP/7/20/Add. 1)
29 RC/WGCA/1, 25 May 2010.
30 Review Conference of the Rome Statute, International Criminal Court, Draft Resolution 
Submitted by the President of the Review Conference: The Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc 
RC/10 (11 June 2010).
31 Review Conference Annex I: Amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC on the Crime 
of Aggression. 
 Annex II: Amendments to the Elements of Crimes. Annex III: Understandings Regarding 
the Amendments to the Rome Statute of the ICC on the Crime of Aggression-Final 
Understandings
32 Annex III: Final Understandings and NN Jurdi, ‘The Domestic Prosecution of the Crime 
of Aggression after the International Criminal Court Review Conference: Possibilities 
and Alternatives’ (2013) 14 MJIL 1, 2
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As a matter of fact, the resolution “is a decisive step in the completion 
of the Rome Statute.”33Moreover, the willingness and cooperation of state 
parties, especially the adoption of amendments by “a text-book example” 
of consensus34, was one the most important achievements of the conference. 
Therefore, the conference represents an important turning point in the 
evolution of international criminal law.
DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION
Preliminary Remarks on  Jus ad Bellum
In order to understand today’s jus ad bellum; first Charter of United 
Nations must be assessed. Article 2 (4) of Charter states: “All Members shall 
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” 
However, there are two exceptions in the UN Charter. One exception is 
found Article 39 and 42 “with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the 
peace and acts of aggression.” And another exception is provided in Article 
51 of right of individual or collective self-defence. The Security Council 
has extensive authority to use of force in Articles 39 and 42, but states have 
limited right of individual and collective self-defence in case of an actual 
armed attack, until the Security Council takes necessary measures to prevent 
the threats against the peace.
Under Article 51, states have a right of individual or collective self-
defence in case of an actual attack, not any other violation of prohibition on the 
use of force in Article 2(4). Therefore, it is possible to say that not all violations 
constitute aggression. As a matter of law, in Nicaragua Case of 1986, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that “the prohibition of armed attacks 
may apply to the sending by a State of armed bands to the territory of another 
State, if such an operation, because of its scale and effects, would have been 
classified as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it been 
33 N. Blokker & C. Kreß, ‘A Consensus Agreement on the Crime of Aggression: Impressions 
from Kampala’ (2010) 23.4 LJIL 889, 889
34 ibid, 891
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carried out by regular armed forces.”35 Also the ICJ scales the acts of use of 
force as ‘grave’ or ‘less grave’, as in the Case of Oil Platforms.36 Hence, in 
the Resolution 3314, the distinction between ‘aggression’ and ‘other uses of 
force’ was clearly put.37 
Definition of Aggression
As above-mentioned, Resolution 3314 served as the basis of the 
SWGCA’s draft amendments in Kampala. Therefore, first the definition 
provided in Resolution 3314 should be discussed.
First of all, in Article 1, Resolution 3314 provides that aggression is “the 
use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or 
political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.” As seen, 
Article 1 defines aggression as based on Article 2(4) of the Charter, thus as a 
violation of use of force. In this regard, as provided in the Article 2, “the first 
use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression.”38 Secondly, Article 3 lists some 
acts that qualify as aggression. Article 4 states that the acts are not “exhaustive 
and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute aggression 
under the provisions of the Charter.”
The definition in Resolution 3314 has been criticized for not clarifying 
the ambiguity of the prohibition on use of force.39 This is particularly because 
of the outcome in Resolution 3314 which provides a description more than a 
definition.40 Furthermore, the negotiating historical record of the definition41 
proves that the resolution was not adopted “for the purpose of imposing 
criminal liability”, but however “it was intended only as a political guide.”42
35 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986) 14, 103
36 Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 6 November 2003, ICJ Reports (2003) 161, 187
37 Definition of Aggression (n 16), paragraph 3
38 Definition of Aggression (n 16), Article 2
39 Constantine Antonopoulos, ‘Whatever Happened to Crimes against Peace?’ (2001) 6.1 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law 33, 39
40 M.E. O’Connell & M. Niyazmatov, ‘What is Aggression? Comparing Jus ad Bellum and 
the ICC Statute’ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 189, 194
41 Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, UN Doc 
A/C.6/SR.1471,8
 October 1974, Annexes 19, 20, 22, 26, 32, 35, and 39
42 Glennon (n 10) 79 citing the US representatives’ remarks on the Resolution 3314
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Moreover, Resolution 3314 did not provide provisions entailing 
individual criminal responsibility. Article 5(2) mentions war of aggression “as 
something apparently distinct from aggression.”43 The article provides that 
“[a] war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives 
rise to international responsibility.”44 As seen, there is no distinction between 
individual responsibility and state responsibility, even no clarity on what the 
international responsibility means. Some authors have argued that Resolution 
3314 entrenches individual criminal responsibility45, others have believed 
that it ensures individual criminal responsibility in contact with a war of 
aggression, because Article 5(2) has a reference to crime.46 The controversy, 
indeed, derives from the definition itself. Briefly put, if Resolution 3314 
had attempted to provide individual criminal accountability, it would have 
included provisions for mens rea of the crime, such as an element of intent 
concerning a potential perpetrator.47
Taken together, “within the jus ad bellum aggression is any serious 
(manifest i.e.) violation of the prohibition on the use of force. A violation of 
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter is a prima facie act of aggression. Acts serious 
enough to trigger the Article 51 right of self-defence will constitute aggression. 
There is no distinct category of ‘war of aggression’ in the jus ad bellum and, 
therefore, no basis on which to establish individual criminal accountability on 
something other than the jus ad bellum prohibition of aggression.”48
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION AND THE ROME STATUTE
Rome Statute After Kampala
As in the famous statement of Nuremberg trials, “crimes are committed 
by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who 
43 ibid, 195
44 Definition of Aggression (n 16), Article 5(2)
45 Benjamin B. Ferencz, ‘The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression: Sieve 
or Substance’, (1975) 10 Journal of International Law and Economics < http://www.
benferencz.org/index.php?id=4&article=30 > accessed 30 April 2014
46 J.H. Doran & B.T. van Ginkel, ‘Aggression as a Crime under International Law and the 
Prosecution of Individuals by the Proposed International Criminal Court’ (1996) 43 
NILR 321, 335 and I.M. Schieke, ‘Defining the Crime of Aggression’ (2001) 14 LJIL 409, 
417
47 Doran & Ginkel (n 46) 335
48 O’Connell & Niyazmatov (n 40) 198
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commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced.”49 
Significantly, Article 8bis of the Rome Statute builds its trivet on a combination 
of state and individual criminal responsibility. The article distinguishes ‘acts 
of aggression’ and ‘crime of aggression’.
Article 8bis defines crime of aggression as “the planning, preparation, 
initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression 
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of 
the Charter of the United Nations.”50
According to Article 8bis (2), act of aggression “means the use of 
armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations.”51 Also, Article 8bis (2) lists example acts of 
aggression as in Article 3 of Resolution 3314.52
The definition of crime of aggression makes an end of the ambiguity 
about the individual responsibility and definitely extends it from the concept of 
‘war of aggression’ to ‘acts of aggression’53, yet there are important questions. 
The crime of aggression is a leadership crime; however the determination 
of a high-ranking position is not based on formal criteria. In the Review 
Conference, there was a considerable debate on the question of whether ‘shape 
and influence’ (Nuremberg standard) or ‘control over or to direct’ should be 
included in the definition, finally the latter was incorporated in the Kampala 
definition. However, the question arises as to whether terrorist organizations, 
49 International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), ‘Judgment and Sentences’ (1947) 41.1 AJIL 
172, 221
50 Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of 
Aggression, Res. RC/Res.6, Annex I, 11 June 2010
51 ibid, article 8bis, para. 2.
52 Definition of Aggression (n 16), Article 3
53 “The Nuremberg Charter had a puzzling requirement of a “war of aggression” which 
prompted the International Military Tribunal to draw a de facto distinction between the 
conquests of Austria and Czechoslovakia (achieved without actual fighting) on the one 
hand, and the invasions of Poland and others (achieved with considerable fighting) on the 
other. The former were classified as “acts of aggression” (and not yet “criminal”), the latter 
as “wars of aggression” and proscribed under the Charter. Control Council Law No. 10, 
under which subsequent prosecutions were brought, had language broad enough to treat 
Austria and Czechoslovakia as criminal aggressions.” cited in R.S. Clark, ‘Amendments 
to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the first Review 
Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May-11 June 2010’ (2010) 2.2 GJIL 689, 698
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insurgency and liberation movements or industrialist economic leaders54 are 
accountable for aggression; this is, indeed, a mystery. Also, another problem 
is that how this requirement can be applied in the chain of command. There 
are no formal criteria in the definition and it is entirely based on the person’s 
effective position, so how far down will the persons in the chain of command 
be responsible?
Obviously, not all acts of aggression induce criminal responsibility. 
Only those acts, which constitute a manifest violation of the Charter by their 
character, gravity and scale, give rise to the responsibility. However, it was 
strongly defended that the word ‘manifest’ is unnecessary because already “…
any act of aggression would constitute a manifest violation of the Charter.”55 
As some argued, it is enough to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction.56 In fact, the 
need for such an additional clause is vague. Because the ICC has already 
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of international concern57 and 
aggression is the gravest violation of the prohibition on the use of force in 
the UN Charter58, thus, the contribution of ‘manifest’ is quite unclear.. Also, 
Paulus points out the definition of the ‘manifest’ and asks brilliantly: “[w]
hat… is obvious for one is completely obscure to the other, in particular in 
international law”.59 Moreover, the reason for not adopting ‘flagrant’ instead 
of ‘manifest’ would have meant to establish a very high threshold.60 Each 
word raises a different concern, that’s for sure. 
However, developing a narrower definition than the one within jus ad 
bellum is somehow understandable for the purposes of the ICC. In fact, this 
was necessary to “exclude some borderline cases”61 from the jurisdiction of 
the ICC. These cases include some ‘grey areas’ of the jus ad bellum, such as 
54 Nuremberg Tribunal found thirteen directors of IG Farben which was a large German 
chemical company, guilty of aggression in The United States of America vs. Carl Krauch, et 
al., also known as IG Farben Trial.
55 2009 SWGCA Report (n 27) 3 para 13
56 S.D. Murphy, ‘Aggression, Legitimacy and the International Criminal Court’ (2010) 20 
EJIL 1147, 1151
57 Rome Statute, article 1.
58 Resolution 3314 (n 16), the Preamble 
59 (‘clearly revealed to the eye, mind, or judgment; … obvious’)  in the Oxford English 
Dictionary A. Paulus, ‘Second Thoughts on the Crime of Aggression’, (2010) 20 EJIL 
1117, 1121
60 O’Connell & Niyazmatov (n 40) 204 citing S. Barriga, ‘Against the Odds: The Result of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression’ (Farnham: Ashgate Pub, 2010)
61 ibid
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anticipatory self-defence and humanitarian intervention.62
Especially, humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue which caused a 
great concern in the conference. Because, NATO’s humanitarian intervention 
of 1999 which was led by the very leading countries of the ICC against 
Serbia during the Kosovo crisis is considered as a serious violation of the 
UN Charter.63 Therefore, as in the words of U.S. representative: “If Article 
8bis were to be adopted as a definition, understandings would need to make 
clear that those who undertake efforts to prevent war crimes, crimes against 
humanity or genocide—the very crimes that the Rome Statute is designed 
to deter—do not commit “manifest” violations of the U.N. Charter within 
the meaning of Article 8bis.”64 In this regard, producing a new and narrower 
definition for a well-functioning prosecution for the crime of aggression and 
providing higher threshold for individual criminal responsibility is quite 
convincing and understandable. 
On the other hand, considering the purposes of the ICC, the high 
threshold can be strongly defended, but one can argue that this approach has 
a “potential to dilute the jus ad bellum.”65 Also, O’Connell and Niyazmatov 
discuss that “creating a narrower crime of aggression than the one found in the 
jus ad bellum had no precedent. At the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, crimes 
against the peace were based on the jus ad bellum of the time. The ILC in its 
commentary to the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind took the position that individual criminal responsibility for the crime 
of aggression depends on ‘a sufficiently serious violation of the prohibition 
contained in Article 2(4)’ of the UN Charter.”66 
However, even the wording ‘sufficiently serious’ in the authors’ argument 
suggests different thresholds for the responsibility. Why is it ‘sufficiently 
serious’, not only ‘serious’? Also, a state can depend on state responsibility 
in the jus ad bellum, even if the act does not pass the threshold entailing 
responsibility. This is to say, there can be a manifest violation of the UN 
62 ibid, citing R. Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure 
(2nd edn., Cambridge University Press, 2010) 326, 327
63 M. Koskenniemi, ‘’The Lady Doth Protest Too Much’ Kosovo, and the Turn to Ethics in 
International Law’, (2002) 65 The Modern Law Review 159, 175
64 Harold Koh, Statement to the Conference, 4 June 2010 <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/
remarks/142665.htm> accessed 30 April 2014
65 O’Connell & Niyazmatov (n 40) 201
66 ibid, 203
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Charter even though the crime does not satisfy the requirements of character, 
gravity and scale. Indeed, Murphy explains this aspect with comparison of 
several possible examples.67 For example, a single aerial attack on a naval 
vessel causing some death and property damage would lead to the breach of 
article 2(4) of the UN Charter entailing State responsibility, also allows for a 
response under Article 51 but not constitute a crime of aggression. Because, 
it cannot pass the threshold. Second, the invasion of a State would lead to the 
breach of article 2(4) of the UN Charter entailing State responsibility, and 
constitute the crime of aggression entailing individual criminal responsibility.68
In this regard, one important aspect about the definition’s coherence with 
the jus ad bellum is the question of whether the ICC’s jurisdiction can reach 
the threats of use of force. As stated in the Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, 
within jus ad bellum, not only use of force, but also the threat to use of force 
is prohibited. On the other hand, the definition of the crime of aggression 
does not mention the threats in Article 8bis. So the article only refers to 
actual acts of aggression. But at the same time, as stated in the Article 8bis 
(1), ‘the planning’ and ‘preparation’ are within the jurisdiction of the ICC, in 
other words, criminalized. So is this to say that an individual could be held 
accountable for the planning and preparation only if such an act actualizes? 
The doctrine thinks that this is a theoretical mismatch. For example, these are 
important questions to ask: “Why is it conceptually coherent for the ICC to 
regard such threats as not being criminal? Similarly, if a massive conspiracy 
of senior officials to commit large-scale aggression is uncovered and thwarted 
at the last minute, why should that conduct not be regarded as criminal?”69 
 As seen, there are controversial issues about the definition of 
aggression in the Rome Statute and important questions that need to be 
answered. Eventually, these problems will come out in the first aggression 
prosecution in the near future. Now, it may be the time to try to solve them.
Mens Rea 
Article 30 (1) of the Rome Statute reads as follows: “Unless otherwise 
provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
67 Murphy (n 56), 1153
68 ibid
69 ibid, 1152
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for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements 
are committed with intent and knowledge.”70 The article further provides that: 
“…a person has intent where: 
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct; 
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that 
consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”71
Nevertheless, given the interpretative guidance for mens rea of the crime 
of aggression in the Amendments to the Elements of Crimes72, there is no 
clarity. Particularly, as stated in Paragraph 2, “[t]here is no requirement to 
prove that the perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to whether the use 
of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” 
However, Paragraph 4 and Paragraph 6 of the Elements bring uncertainty 
into the equation. Paragraph 4 states that “[t]he perpetrator was aware of the 
factual circumstances that established that such a use of armed force was 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.” According to some 
authors, the paragraph refers to the inconsistency with the Charter, thus it 
arguably refers to examples of act of aggression in Article 8bis (2).73 On the 
other hand, Paragraph 6 of the Elements provides that “[t]he perpetrator was 
aware of the factual circumstances that established such a manifest violation 
of the Charter of the United Nations.”
As discussed by O’Connell and Niyazmatov, “it seems realistic to require 
the Court to find that a defendant was aware of the factual circumstance that 
the use of the armed force was inconsistent with the UN Charter, but it is 
hard to see how the Court will be able to find a defendant was also aware 
of the factual circumstances demonstrating the manifest violation of the UN 
Charter.”74 For example, in the recent armed conflict between Russia and 
Ukraine over Crimea, it could be doubted that the actions of Russia constituted 
an act of aggression by its character, gravity and scale75, but Moscow could 
argue that they took action to protect the Russian citizens in Crimea, and thus 
70 Rome Statute, article 30(1).
71 ibid, art. 30(2)
72 Amendments to the Elements of Crimes, Annex II, RC/Res.6,11June 2010.
73 O’Connell & Niyazmatov (n 40) 206
74 ibid
75 Ambassador Muhamed Sacirbey, ‘Might Putin Face International Criminal Court by 
Annexing Crimea?’ Huffington Post, (US, 3 October 2014) ; Kurt Willems, ‘Try Putin for 
‘war crimes’? Unfortunately, not applicable’ Newsobserver, (US, 20 March 2014)
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these actions do not constitute a manifest violation of the UN Charter. It is 
extremely hard to establish that Russia was aware of the factual circumstances 
that such a use of force constituted a manifest violation of the Charter. In 
this manner, some specific provisions in terms of mens rea could have been 
provided in Kampala. This would help the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction for 
further prosecutions more, rather than the adoption of a new definition.
     CONCLUSION
One thing is clear that, the consensus on the crime of aggression 
constitutes a remarkable achievement. Yet, the ICC was established to end 
and defeat the impunity for the most serious crimes of international concern, 
but unless it is not done through fair trials, the question of legitimacy arises. 
Therefore, for the successful further prosecutions of the ICC regarding the 
crime of aggression, the Court must develop careful approaches. 
As mentioned above, it is quite understandable and convincing that for 
effective criminal prosecutions, the ICC would tamper with the concept of 
aggression. Nevertheless, rather than adopting a new substance for the crime 
itself to reach a compromise for political motivations, for example mens rea of 
the crime could have been discussed more. Or, the threshold for the individual 
responsibility could have been narrowed by adding undisputable standards 
considering the importance of the wording of legal documents. 
Taken together, above-discussed aspects raise serious doubts; however, 
despite some problems and pitfalls, the door is still open for clarifying the 
flaws which the conference has failed to solve. At least, this is necessary for 
ending impunity for the serious crime of aggression and thus, preserving the 
hope for the well-functioning of the ICC.
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